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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, State of Utah and three named 
women, appealed from identical memorandum decisions rendered 
in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State 
of Utah, granting summary judgment of dismissal of their 
complaints under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, 
§§78-45-1 et eeq., U.C.A.1953 ( pre-1975 amendment). 
DISPOSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT ON APPEAL 
The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the district 
court, holding that Plaintiffs-Appellants were entitled to 
judgment against the three named defendants for the money 
that had been reasonably and necessarily expended in support 
of their children. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Respondents seek modification of the judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Utah to entitle them to a hearing under 
§78-45-7 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, before the Plaintiffs-
Appellants may take judgment for reimbursement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents adopt the statement of facts that they 
set: forth in their brief on the appeal in the first instance. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S DISTINCTION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
RIGHT OF ONE WHO HAS FURNISHED SUPPORT TO A CHILD TO 
HAVE REIMBURSEMENT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM AN ADJUDICA-
TION OF THE AMOUNT A FATHER SHOULD PAY FOR THE CURRENT 
AND FUTURE SUPPORT OF HIS CHILDREN, SHOULD NOT APPLY 
TO THE STATE UNDER THE UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR 
SUPPORT ACT. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-45-1 et seq. (pre-1975 
amendment) is the Utah version of the Uniform Civil Liabil-
ity for Support Act (hereinafter UCLSA) as issue in the 
instant case. §78-45-1? states: 
...Whenever the state department of 
public welfare furnishes support to 
an obligee, it has the same right as 
the obligee to whom the support was 
furnished, for the purpose of securing 
reimbursement and of obtaining contin-
uing support. 
It is submitted that the rights conferred upon Plaintiff 
State Division of Family Services by the above-cited statute 
are unique, and render inapposite any analogy to the right 
of a private party, not otherwise legally responsible, who 
has furnished support to a child to have reimbursement 
therefor from the person legally responsible for support. 
The normal rule for reimbursement of a person who 
has supplied necessities to a third party is stated in 
Restatement of the Law of Restitution - Quasi Contracts and 
Constructive Trusts, Chapter 5 - Benefits Vaoluntarily 
Conferred, §113, p.464 (American Law Institute 1937): 
PERFORMACE OF ANOTHER'S NONCONTRACTUAL 
DUTY TO SUPPLY NECESSARIES TO A THIRD 
PERSON. 
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A person who has performed the 
noncontractual duty of another by sup-
plying a third person with necessaries 
which in violation of such duty the 
other had failed to supply, although 
acting without the other's knowledge 
or consent, is entitled to restitution 
therefor from the other if he acted 
unofficiously and with intent to charge 
therefor. 
Under this Rule, it should be noted, no right to reimburse-
ment vests in the person until he supplies the necessaries. 
This rule is concerned with the equities of compensating 
the Good Samaratin who is not otherwise under any legal 
duty to provide support. 
What distinguishes the above-mentioned rule from 
that of §78-45-9 U.C.A. 1953 (pre-1975 amendment) is that 
under the latter (UCLSA), the State Division of Family 
Services is given the right to obtain a prospective support 
order against the obligor father "whenever the state depart-
ment of public welfare furnishes support to an obligee.11 
This distinction is indicative of the different purpose of 
the UCLSA from the normal rule of the Restatement of 
Restitution. 
The UCLSA was enacted for the sole purpose of 
obtaining support for needy obligees. To this purpose, the 
State is given the statutory right to obtain a prospective 
support order, which the private person not otherwise 
legally obligated does not have. To allow the State to 
recover more by reimbursement, when no previous support 
order has been entered, than when a previous order has been 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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entered serves to give the State an incentive to not follow 
the UCLSA in immediately obtaining a prospective order, 
since, it is submitted, the prospective support order entered 
will rarely, if ever, be as great an amount as that which 
the needy obligee receives from the State. Why would the 
legislature provide the State with a means of obtaining a 
prospective order if it was not intended that the State 
avail itself of this right? And yet, if the State stands 
to obtain a maximum recovery by seeking reimbursement for 
the full amount expended, it will not attempt to obtain a 
prospective order for a sum certain. That the State may 
intervene, under the UCLSA, in a private divorce action 
has been established by this Court in Bartholomew v. 
Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976). 
The case of named defendant-respondent Kim Bowen 
is instructive. The State seeks reimbursement for the full 
amount it expended from November of 197 2 through February 
of 1973. See attached copy of Complaint and Computation of 
Arrearages in State of Utah and Sharon Bowen v. Kim Bowen, 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, Civil No. 
60315 (Respondents' Exhibit A ) . In late February of 1973 
the Bowens were divorced, and a child support order was 
entered. Sharon Bowen continued to receive a grant from 
the State, and the State brought an action under the UCLSA 
to recover the arrearage. See attached copy of Affidavit 
for an Order to Show Cause and Computation of Arrearages 
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in State of Utah and Sharon Bowen vs. Kim Bowen, Second 
Judicial District Court of Weber County, Civil No. 56314 
(Respondents1 Exhibit B). Note that as soon as the support 
order of $65 per month was entered, the State was bound by 
that amount in determining its recovery from the obligor. 
The only difference between the former case (Civil No. 60315) 
and the latter (Civil No. 56314) is the subsequent court 
order of support. To say that this can lead to different 
results, when the State, unlike the Good Samaratin, could 
have obtained a support order under the UCLSA in November 
of 1972, is, as Mr. Justice Maughan stated in his dissent, 
"to state a distinction without a difference." 
Another indication that analogy of the common law 
view of restitution to the State's right to reimbursement 
under the UCLSA is inapposite, was accurately noted by Mr. 
Justice Henriod in his concurring opinion in the instant 
case, that "if a parent is destitute and as a consequence, 
so is his son, the State equally has an historical and legal 
duty to support such a child," State Division of Family 
Services, et al. v. Clark, et al. , (Utah Supreme Court, Slip 
Opinion at pp.3-4, Sept. 17, 1976) . See also Duncan v. 
Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953); People ex rel. Heydenreich v 
Lyons, 374 111. 557, 30 N.E.2d 46 (1940). This legal duty 
does not bind the kindly neighbor, aunt, grandparent, or 
other person who may provide support. At most, they are 
under a moral duty to provide. Furthermore, in Utah, the 
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State also has a statutory duty to provide support to 
destitute mothers and children. See §§55-15A-l et seq., 
U.C.A. 1953, as amended. Finally, most if not all of the 
cases dealing with reimbursement of the State, County or 
City, including Stafford v. Field, 70 Idaho 331, 218 P.2d 
338 (1950), cited by the majority at p.l, n.2 of its 
opinion, base the amount of reimbursement on, inter alia, 
the obligor's ability to pay. See also Condon v. Pomeroy-
Grace, 73 Conn. 607, 48 A.756 (1901); People to the Use of 
Peoria County v. Hill, 163 111. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896); 
Inhabitants of Freeman v. Dodge, 98 Me. 531, 57 A.884 (1904). 
It is again submitted that the basic purpose of the 
UCLSA is to provide needy spouses and children with an effi-
cient means of obtaining support and support orders. §78-45-7 
sets forth the criteria for determining the amount of support, 
and it takes account of the obligorfs ability to pay. This 
is consonant with Utah's position that support orders are 
based on ability to provide support. Hulse v. Hulse, III 
Utah 193, 176 P.2d 875 (1947); Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 
Utah 261, 236 P.457 (1925); Cooke v. Cooke, 248 P.83 (Utah 
1926); Anderson v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 132 
(1946); Ottley v. Hill, 21 Utah 2d 396, 446 P.2d 301 (1968). 
Respondents do not contend that if they are indigent, at the 
time the State files for reimbursement, that they are not 
liable therefor, Respondents contend only that, in determining 
the amount of reimbursement to which the State is entitled, 
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that the trial court be allowed to consider all of the 
criteria advanced under §78-45-7 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
CONCLUSION -
From the above and foregoing authorities, Respondents 
submit that the UCLSA is meant to deal with matters of 
support; that the act confers rights upon the State Division 
of Family Services which a third party, not otherwise legally 
obligated, does not have in terms of seeking reimbursement 
for support already provided; and that for these reasons, the 
State should be entitled to judgment for reimbursement only 
after the obligor from whom reimbursement is sought has had 
an opportunity to have the amount of reimbursement determined 
at a hearing pursuant to §78-45-7 U.C.A 1953, as amended. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MAZLUU (V • ULJI^LSQL*^ 
MARTIN W. CUSTEN 
Attorney for Respondents 
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